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examine the effectiveness of this approach to alter implicit and explicit attitudes. Second, to test the contention that making individuals consciously aware of their implicit attitudes (Menatti et al., 2012; Power et al., 2009 ) may be a particularly effective means of bringing about attitude change. Third, to combine ISC (Crisp & Turner, 2009 ) and implicit attitude feedback (Menatti et al., 2012) to examine if this may reduce implicit and/or explicit stigmatized attitudes toward individuals with mental illness.
Method Participants
Following ethical approval, opportunity sampling was employed to recruit 61 undergraduate students. Participants took part on a voluntary basis and were retained on the basis of two inclusion criteria: no previous social contact with an individual diagnosed with any mental health problems (such as close relatives or friends), in light of research which suggests that prior contact can increase positive attitudes toward this group (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996; Brown, 2012) ; second, they had no previous exposure to, or knowledge of, the IRAP.
Upon completion of IRAP practice trials, data from 13 participants were removed from the sample for failure to respond with at least 80% accuracy and with response latencies below 2,000 milliseconds (ms) (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010; Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Power et al., 2009 ).
Materials and Equipment
Explicit measure. A sub-section of the Community Attitudes toward the mentally ill scale, specifically the 10-item social restrictiveness scale (CAMI-SR; Taylor & Dear, 1981, Cronbach's a = .80) gauged participants' explicit attitudes towards individuals with a mental illness. This questionnaire was administered to participants directly after the ISC manipulation in order to examine the change in stigmatizing and socially restrictive attitudes towards people with a mental illness. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which individuals with a mental illness are perceived as dangerous (i.e., "The mentally ill are far less dangerous than most people suppose" and "Most women who were once patents in a mental hospital can be trusted as babysitters") and the degree to which they would avoid an individual with a mental illness (i.e., The mentally ill should be isolated from the rest of the community" and "I would not want to live next door to someone who had been mentally ill").
Responses were marked on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Higher scores on this measure indicated a greater propensity to avoid an individual with a mental illness and a heightened perception that they are dangerous. The internal consistency of the CAMI-SR was satisfactory in both Phase 1, (α = .74) and Phase 2 of the experiment (α = .76).
Implicit measure. In the current study, the IRAP measured participants' implicit attitudes towards individuals with a mental illness. The IRAP was presented on a computer situated in a laboratory setting. It comprised of the sample stimuli 'mentally ill person' and 'physically ill person' and twelve positive and negative evaluative target relations (see Table   1 ). The sample stimuli of 'mentally ill person' was paired with the comparison of 'physically ill person' due to previous research which found that participants were both implicitly and explicitly biased towards individuals with a mental illness compared to those with a physical illness (Teachman, Wilson, & Kamarovskaya, 2006) . Negative evaluative target relations were selected from a list of words that are commonly associated with mental illness (Rose et al., 2007) .
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] To capture the direction of participants' attitudinal relations, two response options of 'similar' and 'opposite' were directly paired with the sample stimuli. IRAP trial types were categorized in line with previous research (Crisp et al., 2000; Dickerson et al., 2002; Menatti et al., 2012; Pescosolido et al., 1999; Rose et al., 2007) and reflected participants' consistent or inconsistent verbal relations (Power et al., 2009) . . Accordingly, participants were required to relate the phrases 'mentally ill person' and 'physically ill person' to positive and negative terms that could be readily categorized as safe or dangerous.
To aid participants' understanding of these four IRAP trial types, participants were presented with four visual aids before the test began. These visual aids were constructed from Participants competed two practice blocks in order to evaluate their accuracy and average response latencies. A maximum limit of four attempts was set for participants to pass the practice blocks and commence on to the critical blocks. During both the practice and critical blocks, participants were instructed as to which sample stimuli should be paired with a specific response. After each block, participants were then instructed that the previously correct and incorrect responses would be reversed in the next block, thus, eliminating any trial-and-error learning (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010a) . A total of eight blocks were presented to participants. Each block of IRAP trials contained eight exposures to each of the four trial types, presented quasi-randomly across a block. This resulted in a total of 32 trials in each block, with a set restriction that none of the four trial types could be presented twice in succession. The positioning of the two response options were also presented quasi-randomly and could not appear in the same left-right position more than three times in succession.
Participants progressed through trials by pressing the correct response option, which then removed all stimuli from the screen for 400ms before the next trial was presented. Choosing an incorrect response resulted in a red cross appearing on the screen, with the trial continuing once the correct option had been selected.
IRAP scoring
The primary data produced by IRAP trials are response times (RTs), defined as milliseconds between the onset of the trial and a correct response. Accuracy was also recorded in every trial, however this data was simply employed as a screening mechanism to ensure that only scores with greater than 80% accuracy in practice and test blocks were included within analyses. D-IRAP scores were computed from the RTs of critical test blocks following the improved scoring algorithm by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) :
Step (1) Only RTs from test blocks were used; (2) RTs above 10,000ms from test blocks were eliminated; (3) all data for participants were removed if they produced more than 10% of test block trials with RTs less than 300ms; (4) 12 standard deviations were computed across the six test blocks; (5) 24 mean RTs for the four trial types in each block were calculated; (6) the difference score were calculated by subtracting the mean latency score from the consistent trial (mentally ill person-dangerous, physically ill person-harmless) from the mean latency of the inconsistent trial (mentally ill person-harmless, physically ill person-dangerous); (7) Those that were in the two control conditions did not listen to this digital recording.
Participants were then asked to define the terms 'dangerous' and 'harmless' to ensure that they understood the nature of the words used in the IRAP. To examine explicit and implicit attitudes towards individuals with a mental illness, all participants then completed an explicit (i.e., CAMI-SR) and implicit (i.e., IRAP) attitude measure, administered in a counterbalanced design. These measures were administered after the ISC manipulation in order to examine its participants being told that they had revealed a "moderate implicit stigmatized attitude in relation to individuals with a mental illness". Participants with a score of .65 or above were notified that they had displayed a "strong implicit stigmatized attitude", and a "no difference" feedback message was given to participants with D-scores within the range of 0.0-0.14 (Menatti et al., 2012) . Negative D-IRAP scores indicated that participants held a positive implicit bias towards individuals with a mental illness, and this was communicated to participants using the same effect size guidelines (Cohen, 1992) . Participants assigned to the conditions of ISC without feedback and control without feedback did not receive implicit attitude feedback.
Phase Two. Phase 2 acted as a follow-up to examine whether receiving implicit attitude feedback, or simply participating in the implicit attitude measurement procedure can reduce implicit and explicit attitudes. All 48 participants were re-recruited after a 24-hour gap following initial experimental testing and re-assigned to their original experimental conditions. Participants then completed the IRAP and CAMI-SR for a second time. These measures were, again, administered in a counterbalanced design.
Results

Analytic Strategy
In relation to the statistical analytic procedure, a 2 (Experimental phase) 4 (IRAP trial type) 4 (Experimental condition) mixed factorial design was utilized. Specifically, experimental phase (1 and 2), and the four IRAP trial types (mentally ill person-dangerous, mentally ill person-harmless, physically ill person-dangerous, physically ill person-harmless)
were input as within-subject variables. The four experimental conditions, as detailed above,
were input as between-participants variables.
Implicit Measures
For clarity of interpretation the mean D-IRAP scores for the trial types of 'mentally ill person-dangerous' and 'mentally ill person-safe' were inverted so that positive scores indicate that participants held the belief that individuals with a mental illness were harmless, and negative scores indicate the belief that individuals with a mental illness were dangerous. 
Discussion
In the first of its kind, the current study examined the effectiveness of ISC combined with implicit attitude feedback as a method for reducing public stigma toward individuals with a In Phase 1 of experimental testing, participants who were assigned to ISC without implicit attitude feedback held a neutral implicit attitude toward individuals with a mental illness, neither believing that they were harmless or dangerous. However, following a 24-hour break from experimental testing, participants revealed an implicit positive bias toward individuals with a mental illness. In Phase 2, participants assigned to the condition of ISC combined with implicit attitude feedback displayed an implicit positive bias toward individuals with a mental illness compared to participants who did not undergo this intervention. Furthermore, the addition of implicit feedback in the control condition did not decrease participants stigmatizing implicit attitudes toward individuals with a mental illness.
In other words, our findings suggest that ISC (Crisp & Turner, 2009 ) may be a direct and effective implicit attitude change intervention, with positive attitudes toward indivi-duals with a mental illness further enhanced by the addition of implicit attitude feedback.
These results appear to be in line with the assertion that when an individual recognizes the difference between their perceived behavior and the way they actually behave they may undergo a global feeling of discomfort, which leads to the individual engaging in efforts to decrease this discrepancy (Festinger, 1957; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002) . As such, in combination with ISC, simply making an individual consciously aware of their implicit attitudes may act as a 'cue for control' − increasing self-regulatory behavior and reducing stereotypical attitudes (ibid). From this perspective, combining implicit attitude measurement with implicit attitude feedback may influence individuals to reflect more deeply on their attitudes than they might during explicit procedures alone.
The theory of ISC is also consistent with the theoretical framework of mental simulation (Crisp & Birtel, 2014; Miles & Crisp, 2014) , which posits that the effects of mental imagery on behavior operate via the availability of mental scripts and cognitive representations (Schank & Albelson, 1977) . Drawing on this literature may provide a greater explanation as to why ISC is most effective when combined with implicit attitude feedback.
Perhaps the very conceptualization of a positive contact situation contradicts the implicit attitudes held by participants pre-experiment, thus creating new cognitive representations and mental scripts. Such an explanation would be in contrast to primary cognitive theorizing (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011) which postulate that implicit attitudes − as mental representations − should be stable across time and contexts (Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Smith & De Coster, 1999; Wilson et al., 2000) . Rather, results from the current study may support the recent assertion that implicit attitudes may be influenced by social and contextual cues (Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004; BarnesHolmes et al., 2010b; Cullen et al., 2009; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Hahn, Judd, Hirsch, & Blair, 2013) . Viewing implicit attitudes as adaptive rather than fixed representations may be an important premise for the development of interventions that strive for stigma reduction by addressing both explicitly and implicitly held attitudes. Rose et al., 2007; Rüsch, Todd, Bodenhausen, & Corrigan, 2010) , rather than participants' own beliefs. This viewpoint provides additional support for the notion that explicit attitude measures might be vulnerable to contextual control (Corrigan & Shapiro, 2010; Davies, 1997; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Schwarz, 1999; Power et al., 2009) . Therefore, as individuals may adhere to socially acceptable expectations when attitudes are gauged explicitly, there would appear to be a great potential utility in employing implicit methodologies in the measurement of socially sensitive attitudes. Accordingly, researchers should look to employ both explicit and implicit measures to reliably observe a reduction in stigmatizing attitudes.
A contradictory theory, however, argues that both explicit and implicit attitudes may co-exist in memory (Wilson et al., 2002) , and influence behavior in diverse ways (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) . The model of dual attitudes (Wilson et al., 2000) posits that the attitudes that individuals endorse at any given time depend on whether the explicit attitude is able to override an implicitly held one. In line with this assertion, participants in the current study may not have had the cognitive capacity to report reliably a change in their explicit attitudes. This interpretation is supported by Gawronski and LeBel (2008) who suggest implicit and explicit attitudes may diverge in a number of instances: First, when categorization of an attitude object with positive or negative evaluative terms creates new automatic associations in memory. Second, when additional consideration of the attitude object eliminates the impact of automatic relations on self-reported evaluative judgments. In the process of considering a hypothetical contact situation, therefore, participants may have acquired a new implicit attitude but may not have been able to reliably report this via explicit self-report measures. This notion contributes to recent research which has provided evidence for the existence of two, distinct cognitive categorization systems -one explicit and one implicit -which are adaptive in nature (Smith et al., 2014) . Past interventions that solely target explicit attitudes may thus be neglecting the presence of unintentional, but yet stigmatizing, implicit attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) .
Limitations and Future Recommendations
There are a number of noteworthy limitations to the current research. First, the ISC Crisp et al., 2000) . However, other mental health diagnoses, such as mild depression, may not be subject to the same stigmatizing evaluations. It is therefore plausible that the ISC experience may vary depending on the mental health diagnosis included in the manipulation.
Nevertheless, participants were asked to define the term 'dangerous' before tests of implicit and explicit attitudes were administered and this may counteract this limitation to some extent. Specifically, this prime may have influenced participants to subsequently imagine a person with mental illness who would be typically classified as 'dangerous' in a positive encounter.
Furthermore, some participants were unable to complete the implicit attitude measure in a quick and accurate manner and were thus disregarded from the final analyses.
Nevertheless, the use of such stringent criteria ensures that participants understand and comply with the IRAP instructions and therefore increase the validity and reliability of IRAP performance (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010b) . The complexity of the task also limits contaminating sources of contextual control (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010a) and faking (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007) . In this respect, the IRAP may provide researchers with an efficacious tool to diagnose and reduce implicit stigmatizing attitudes, which is freely accessible and available for wide dissemination. Furthermore, given that the IRAP provides a direct measure of implicit attitudes and produces automatically the attitude score, it may be utilized to provide a measure of implicit attitude feedback. Furthering this, participants were asked to categorize the terms 'mentally ill person'
and 'physically ill person' to the IRAP target stimuli of 'dangerous' and 'harmless'. It is plausible that the language used in the implicit test could reflect benevolent paternalism rather than an increase in positive attitudes (Link, 2004) . As such, researchers should be aware that IRAP effects might depend on the stimuli employed to instantiate target and attribute concepts (De Houwer, 2002 ).
In conclusion, implicit attitudes have predominantly been viewed as fixed and immutable (Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Smith & Decoster, 1999; Wilson et al., 2000) . Consequently, the development of interventions aiming to change implicit attitudes has been neglected (Wilson et al., 2000) . The current study, however, points 
